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Using financial, accounting and questionnaire response data we investigate the post-
acquisition performance of 47 US bank holding companies that executed 579 mergers and
acquisitions in the 1964-1996 period and compare it with their competitors’ performance. The
objectives of the study are to identify the factors that explain the variance in the distribution of
post-acquisition performance, and to test whether the financial markets efficiently predict
performance outcomes by incorporating public information about the acquiring firm into the
stock price following the acquisition announcement.
The tested model includes measures of post-acquisition decisions, such as the degree of
integration of the target within the acquirer’s structure and the replacement of the top
management team, as well as approximations of the acquirer’s capability to implement the
integration process.  We find that prior acquisition experience does not improve post-acquisition
performance, but the degree to which acquirers articulate and codify their experience in ad-hoc
tools does. Furthermore, a high level of integration of the target within the acquirer’s
organization improves long-term performance, whereas the replacement of top management
worsens it.  Financial markets do not seem to be sensitive to any of these predictors of
performance in their short-term reactions, but long-term adjustments are significantly impacted
by acquirers’ integration strategies and codified implementation knowledge, in line with the
variations of accounting returns.
JEL classification: G2, G21, G34, L2
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1. Introduction
Corporate acquisitions have been the subject of intense study in the financial economics literature.
A primary concern of these efforts was dedicated to understand the phenomenon in terms of its
overall social welfare implications (Manne, 1965; Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Jarrell et al, 1988),
thereby accepting an implicit assumption of high homogeneity among the acquisitive events.  The
empirical inquiries have in fact prioritized the efforts to locate the mean of the distribution of
acquisition performance for both acquiring and target firms, in order to assess the average impact of
acquisitions on financial wealth (Franks et al., 1991; Loderer and Kenneth 1992; Agrawal et al.
1992).  The industry-specific literature on bank mergers has followed suit, in their attempts to
evaluate the average magnitude of abnormal gains from acquisitive growth (Hawawini & Swary,
1990; Rhoades, 1994; Pilloff and Santomero, 1998; Berger, Demsetz and Strahan, 1999).
Contingent arguments, however, have been recently introduced in order to achieve a better
understanding of the variation of acquisition performance around its mean.  They typically have to
do with characteristics of the negotiation process, such as the degree of hostility and the number of
simultaneous bidders, or with characteristics of the two firms before their merger, such as their
strategic relatedness (Healy, Palepu and Ruback, 1992), the acquirer’s pre-acquisition performance
(or relative “glamour” status, Rau and Vermaelen, 1998), and the acquirer’s strategic intent (Healy,
Palepu and Ruback, 1997).
The objective of this article is to propose two additional classes of explanations for the variation in
post-acquisition performance: (1) the decision-making process which defines the approach taken to
manage the post-acquisition integration phase, and (2) the degree to which the acquiring firm has
developed a specific capability to implement the post-acquisition integration decisions.3
If the acquirer selects the appropriate integration approach among the available alternatives, invests
sufficient time and efforts to extract from its own past acquisition experiences the valuable lessons
and uses this knowledge to constantly improve its management of the integration process, then the
post-acquisition performance of its transactions should be systematically superior to the one of
competitors that either select sub-optimal integration approaches, or invest less time in introspecting
and learning.
Using financial, accounting and questionnaire response data we investigate the post-acquisition
performance of 47 US bank holding companies that executed 579 mergers and acquisitions in the
1964-1996 period. We compare it with competitors’ performance to understand the role of
company’s previous experience and decisions at the integration phase as factors explaining the
variation in post-acquisition performance of the acquiring firms.
Our results suggest that both integration decisions and learning from prior experiences do play an
important role in explaining the variation in performance of the focal acquisition. The level of
integration of the acquired firm within the acquirer’s organization is positively related to
performance, while the replacement of the target’s management influences performance in a strong
and negative way. With respect to the integration capability, the accumulation of prior acquisition
experience is not conducive of improved performance, but the degree of codification of acquisition-
specific knowledge in manuals and systems does improve post-acquisition performance. These
findings are confirmed by both accounting and long-term financial performance measures, but do
not hold using short-term stock price reactions.
Some of the implications of the uncovered evidence for market efficiency theory are discussed in
the final section of the paper.  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
theoretical arguments advanced in order to explain the role of post-acquisition integration decisions4
and of organizational learning processes.  Section 3 describes the data used and the methodologies
applied for the empirical testing of the research hypotheses.  Section 4 summarizes the results of the
analysis and Section 5 concludes with a set of implications for the development of the acquisition
performance and market efficiency theories.
2. Theory Development
Why do post-acquisition decisions matter as drivers of acquisition performance?  What do these
decisions look like? What do we mean by integration capability and how does it develop?  These
are some of the key questions that we intend to tackle in the present section of the paper.  In doing
so, we also proceed with the submission of a set of testable hypotheses.
Post-acquisition Decisions
The literature on acquisitions has been focusing on the pre-requisites and on the performance
implications of acquisitive events, leaving the process through which the acquiring firm creates (or
destroys) shareholders value by integrating the target into its own organization, largely unexplored
and unexplained.  This “black box” approach was so far justified on two principal accounts.  On a
theoretical level, existing views of the firm as a nexus of contracts (Fama, 1980) or as a mechanism
to minimize transaction costs (Williamson, 1979) did not allow for idiosyncratic differences in the
endowment of resources and capabilities, which can in turn explain why firm might behave
differently in similar circumstances. In other words, pre-acquisition conditions should dictate, in a
world without stable differences among firms with respect to their resources, routines and
competencies, a predictable and homogeneous set of post-acquisition decisions and actions.
Therefore, in a performance model with both pre-acquisition conditions and post-acquisition
decisions, the former will turn out to be the drivers of the variation in performance, while the latter
will not be significant factors. In addition, the limited attention to post-acquisition integration
processes was justified, on an empirical level, by the lack of publicly available data and the
difficulties in gathering sufficiently reliable estimates.5
In a more realistic account of firm behavior, though, this does not necessarily have to be the case.
Both the work of the behavioral school (March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963, March,
1994) and of evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Winter, 1987; Nelson, 1995:
Winter, 1995; Cohen et al., 1996) propose that the firm is to be viewed as a stable set of routinized
behaviors which slowly evolve through the accumulation of knowledge, primarily derived from
internal, direct, experience.  If this is true, then post-acquisition decisions and consequent behaviors
might be the outcome of established routines developed by the acquiring firm, over and above the
characteristics of the individual transaction that needs to be managed.  In a theoretical model of
acquisition performance, then, post-acquisition decisions might have a role to play irrespectively of
pre-acquisition conditions.
In this paper, we make an exploratory attempt to pursue this line of thought by taking into
consideration two important types of post-acquisition decisions.  The first has to do with the degree
to which the acquired organization is integrated within the acquirer’s.  In a banking context, this
implies to know whether the information systems have been converted, the product lines
standardized, the payroll and MIS uniformed, the staff functions centralized, etc.  The second
dimension relates to the degree to which the pre-acquisition resources of the target company have
been either substituted with equivalent ones from the acquirer, or disposed of.  Examples include,
but are not limited to, the replacement of the top management team, of the company name and
identity, of the headquarters and other facilities, of brand names, and so on.  Given a certain level of
organizational integration targeted, the acquirer has a choice in deciding how aggressive it wants to
be in replacing pre-existing resources. Does it prefer to build consensus in aligning the use of
target’s resources to the practices adopted by the acquirer, or does it find it more appropriate to
speed up the process and eradicate opposition and uncertainty by replacing or disposing of target’s
resources ? The answer will have to control for the obvious explanation based on the quality of the6
target’s resources, as the probability of replacement will obviously be inversely proportional to their
quality.
In each of these decisions there are important trade-offs to be managed.  In the case of the level of
integration, the acquiring firm will have to weight the benefits from realizing economies of scale
and scope with the costs derived from higher levels of complexity in the management of the
integration process.  The higher the level of integration between the two organizations, the higher
the number of semi-simultaneous and highly inter-related decisions that  have to be made by an
increasing number of organizational functions. This translates in larger amounts of data
requirements to support the decision-making efforts and in more people and teams to coordinate
during the execution phase.  The probability to disrupt existing routines and inadvertently
destroying valuable competencies will also be positively associated with the level of organizational
integration among the two firms. It will be important, then, to provide an empirical test for the
following hypothesis:
H1: The higher the level of post-acquisition integration, the better the performance of the
acquisition
Further, the decision about the replacement of target’s resources can be viewed as the result of
attempts to balance the benefits deriving from (i) reduced uncertainty in the outcomes of the
decision process (employees know sooner what their fate is) and (ii) faster implementation of the
integration process (higher NPV of cost efficiencies and revenue enhancements), with the costs
suffered as a consequence of disruptions in existing routines, of increased conflict and of undesired
loss of competencies, as many of the employees targeted for retention (usually the best quality ones)
end up leaving.  If the benefits of resource replacement outweigh the costs, the standard view of
acquisitions as a policing mechanism for agency problems, whereby better top management teams
replace poorly performing ones on the market for corporate control, would be supported.  However,7
the only existing evidence on the performance implications of the replacement of the target’s top
management team (Cannella and Hambrick, 1993; Krishna, Miller and Judge, 1997) seems to
indicate that costs are superior to the benefits of replacing existing resources, and that this second
dimension of the integration process has a negative overall impact on acquisition performance.  We
will then test the following hypothesis:
H2: The higher the degree of replacement of the top management team of the acquired firm, the
worse the performance of the acquisition
Integration Capability
In addition to differences in the post-acquisition integration approach, another important source of
heterogeneity between acquiring firms concerns the degree to which they develop and master the
process to integrate the two organizations.  For example, many acquiring banks in the US have now
learned how to convert the information systems and the entire branch network of the acquired
institution following a so-called “big bang” approach, where all happens during the space of a
week-end.  During the 80s, however, few acquisitions were managed with this technique, and
information systems were either not converted or converted slowly, in batches of branches grouped
by geographic zone.  European bank acquisitions, a rather new phenomenon compared to the US,
are still typically managed with the conservative “batch”, as opposed to the faster but riskier “big
bang” approach. The ability to convert information systems in one solution can therefore be
considered an example of an acquisition-specific capability collectively developed by the acquiring
organization (Thakor, 1999).  Another example is the completion of the personnel evaluation
process and the communication of its results within a few weeks from the closing of the transaction.
This might have an important effect on the ability of the combined entity to retain and motivate
employees (Schweiger and DeNisi, 1992), and therefore on the probability to successfully
implement the integration decisions.8
How does an integration capability emerge ?  And, more in general, how do organizations create
and evolve organizational capabilities?  In this paper, we propose a model of acquisition
performance which takes into consideration two learning mechanisms. The first one relies on
“learning-by-doing” processes and can be approximated by the simple accumulation of prior
acquisition experience (Yelle, 1979; Dutton and Thomas, 1984 for good reviews of the “learning
curve” literature in operations management).  The second is derived from the articulation and
codification of knowledge derived from prior experiences, through which the firm produces an
improved understanding of the causal relationships between decisions/actions made and
performance outcomes obtained.  By developing integration manuals, check-lists and decision
support software, by analyzing process performance metrics and writing post-mortem documents,
acquiring firms can keep on improving their understanding of the performance implications of their
actions.
A manual on the information systems conversion process or on the affiliation of the target’s human
resources, an electronic model to support decisions about the staffing of the acquired bank’s
branches or about comparing and standardizing the two product lines are some examples in point.
Knowledge codification might have a positive influence on the performance of acquisition
processes for several reasons:
1. These tools serve as repositories of organizational memory; they provide a trace of what was
decided and done in past instances, particularly useful in relatively infrequent and complex
processes such as acquisitions
2. They facilitate the diffusion of knowledge to parts of the organization different from the one
where the higher level of understanding is achieved.  For example, a manual provides a fast and
effective training for people new to the process.9
3. They clarify the roles, responsibilities and deadlines for all the people involved in the execution
of large numbers of inter-dependent tasks, thereby facilitating the coordination of the entire
process.
4. Finally, and in our opinion most importantly, the process by which these tools are created and
developed necessitates collective cognitive efforts to identify the links between decisions,
actions and performance implications. It is by creating and updating these tools that acquirers
figure out what worked and what did not work in their past experiences and formulate ideas for
the improvement of future integration processes.
Effectiveness and Limitations of Learning Mechanisms
The next and final step in our analysis consists in the assessment of the relative effectiveness of
experience accumulation and knowledge codification processes in influencing acquisition
performance.  The accumulation of acquisition experience relies on the ability of individuals
exposed to past experiences to recall the lessons tacitly absorbed and apply them to the current
situation.  This works well when the task to be mastered is frequent, sufficiently homogeneous and
relatively unambiguous in its links between the actions or decisions made and the performance
outcomes obtained.  If one or more of these assumptions are relaxed, though, learning becomes
correspondingly more difficult.  In extreme cases, characterized for instance by particularly high
heterogeneity and causal ambiguity, individuals might end up applying lessons learned in one
context to a seemingly similar but inherently different one.  In these cases, known in cognitive
psychology as negative transfer effects (Cormier and Hagman, 1987), past experience not only does
not help enhance the performance of the current task, but might actually hinder it.  Corporate
acquisitions, unfortunately, are likely to be part of this last category of organizational tasks, where
the coupling of low frequency, high heterogeneity and high causal ambiguity might very well
increase the probability of negative learning effects.  In the first empirical study on these issues, in
fact, Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) find support for a quadratic, U-shaped relationship between
acquisition experience and performance, with minimum at around 9 acquisition experiences.10
In these difficult learning conditions, though, explicit cognitive efforts aimed at understanding the
causal links between past actions and past performance might actually represent at least a partial
solution to the limitations of the tacit experience accumulation mechanism. Knowledge
codification, then, might prove to be a more powerful learning mechanism, compared with tacit
experience accumulation in particularly complex learning environments, such as acquisition
processes.   Even knowledge codification comes at a price, though.  The costs related to the
investment of time, energy and managerial attention in creating and updating these tools might at
some point overcome the benefits of developing collective competence.  At some point, then, the
positive influence of knowledge codification on performance might reach a plateau and even turn
into a negative one.  A virtuous bureaucratic process, such as learning-driven codification efforts,
might hit the point of decreasing, and perhaps negative, returns.
Cognizant of the boundaries to the effectiveness of the learning mechanisms considered, we submit
the following hypotheses:
H3: The larger the acquiring firm’s past acquisition experience, the better the performance of the
acquisition
H4: The higher the degree of codification of knowledge derived from past acquisition experience,
the better the performance of the acquisition
In addition, if the intuition on the relative superiority of the knowledge codification-based
mechanism under increasing levels of complexity and causal ambiguity is right, we can advance the
following hypothesis relative to the interaction between the degree of knowledge codification and
the level of integration (as a proxy of process complexity).




The test of the hypotheses derived above was carried out on a sample of acquisitions in the US
banking industry.  The industry selected was considered particularly appropriate in light of the
intense acquisition activity characterizing the sector, and the qualitative evidence, gathered through
a round of interviews with 27 managers in 12 experienced acquirers, of both cross-sectional and
longitudinal differences in the way acquirers manage the integration process and develop
standardized and codified implementation procedures.
We use data from several sources of different nature.  For the time period from 1977
1 to 1998, we
collect information about the announcement dates and participants of bank acquisitions from the
SNL and/or SDC databases. In event studies it is very important to identify the exact dates of
events. We consider SNL data to be a more reliable source, as it is specialized in tracking down
acquisitions in the banking sector and it routinely follows up any announcement with a brief
questionnaire sent to the acquiring bank to check and gather precise data. When different dates
existed for the same event, we consulted the  Lexis-Nexis database as a third source.  In cases of
discrepancies, we always selected the earliest announcement date as the event date.
We then used CRSP tapes from January 1977 to December 1998 to extract company’s daily returns
for 250 days before and 10 days after the announcement and monthly returns for five years before
and four years after the announcement. We also used CRSP value-weighted index return as a proxy
for the market return.
                                               
1 Although we had information about some mergers dated as early as 1964, missing observations for these data rendered
them impossible to use as focal events. Therefore, the earliest mergers that were actually used in the analysis are dated
to 1982 with data necessary for the calculations going back to 197712
In order to gather non-public data on post-acquisition integration decisions and on the acquisition-
specific tools eventually developed by the acquiring firms, a questionnaire-based survey was
administered under a grant by the Sloan Foundation and with the support of the Wharton Financial
Institutions Center. The survey was developed after a one-year fieldwork and in cooperation with
12 experienced bank acquirers and then rolled out to the largest 250 U.S. bank holding companies.
The survey consisted of an “Acquisition History Profile”, where information on a set of variables,
including target’s asset quality, market overlap (in-market vs. out-market transaction), post-
acquisition integration level and target’s management replacement, was gathered for each
acquisition completed since founding.  It also had a 5-page questionnaire on the general
characteristics of the acquisition process adopted by the respondents, including the existence and
the time of development of acquisition-specific tools, such as due diligence check-lists and
manuals, system conversion manuals, branch staffing and product mapping software, HR affiliation
manuals and so on.
Of the 250 bank holding companies contacted, 83 turned out to have had no significant acquisition
experience within the previous 10 years.  Of the remaining 167, we received complete responses
from 47 firms that had executed 579 acquisitions since their founding (or their creation from a
merger of equals). The timeframe covered by the acquisitions in the sample starts from 1964 (date
of the oldest acquisition recorded by any respondent) and ends in 1995 (year of the survey).  Mean
comparison tests confirmed that the sample was not biased with respect to the original universe in
terms of earning ratios (ROA, ROE and efficiency ratios), but biased in terms of asset size (the
sample was larger, p < .05).
It is important to note that the measures of the key theoretical variables measured through the
survey instrument are not “opinions”, but factual reports.  Acquisition experience was computed by
counting the number of transactions completed by the acquirer before the focal one.  Knowledge13
codification was proxied with the count of tools developed by the acquiring firm at the time of the
focal acquisition.  The level of integration was the response to a detailed question that mentioned
actual integration activities, such as the conversion of information systems, the alignment of the
lending procedures and the standardization of the product line.  The replacement of the top
management team was also the response to a question, which clearly spelled out the meaning of
four increasing levels, from complete retention to complete substitution.  In addition, construct
validity of the single item scales (integration, replacement, relatedness and quality) was checked
with multiple item scales gathered on a sub-sample of 57 acquisitions by 29 acquirers through a
second, survey conducted with an 8-page questionnaire gathering detailed data on the
characteristics of the acquired bank and of the post-acquisition integration decisions.  All, but the
relatedness construct, resulted highly correlated both with the single factor extracted by the
multidimensional scales, and with the sum of their standardized values (Nunnally, 1978).  The
relatedness measure was correlated only with external factors, such as the geographic location and
the type of customers served, and will hence be referred to as “market overlap”, as opposed to the
wider notion of resource relatedness.
Finally, we used Compustat tapes to get historical accounting information about these 47 companies
or their predecessors for a period starting in 1985 and ending in 1997.  The decreasing number of
banks covered in the years previous to 1985 discouraged us in pursuing older starting years.  We
also collected annual returns on assets (ROA) data for all the (330) bank holding companies
available on Compustat for the same period. We divided the U.S. into 7 geographic regions and
calculated annual equally weighted average ROA for each region using the ROAs of their banks.
In order to enhance the comparability among observations and the precision of the exercise,
mergers of equals and acquisitions with repeated announcements from the data set were excluded
from the sample.14
The methodology
We use a standard event study methodology to examine the effects of our variables of interest on
both short-term returns surrounding the acquisition announcement and on long-term performance.
Short-term performance is calculated over windows of –3, –5 and –10 days around the
announcement. The abnormal results are calculated relative to the beta-adjusted market model,
when the CRSP value-weighted index is used as a proxy for market returns. To estimate the market
model parameters, alpha (an intercept) and beta (a slope), we take a sample of stock-price daily
returns at {-250;-30) days before the announcement and regress it on the CRSP value-weighted
index daily returns over the same period. Then we use the regression coefficients  (market a and b)
to calculate the predicted stock returns and use the predicted values to calculate the cumulative
abnormal returns (CARs).
For long-term performance, we calculate results for up to 48 months following the announcement.
We use three different types of measures to evaluate performance, with the first two being the
standard measures of other event studies (see, for example, D. Ikenberry, J. Lakonishok and T.
Vermaelen (1995)). The first technique is based on CARs relative to a benchmark, the second type
calculates abnormal performance assuming buy-and-hold strategy and the third type is using
accounting data as a performance with respect to competitors. For CARs, abnormal returns are
calculated relative to two benchmarks: beta-adjusted market model and size- and market-to-book
(MTB) based benchmark. We also used the Fama-French three-factor model, which gave results
similar to the beta-adjusted model. In order to estimate the market as and bs for the beta-adjusted
and the Fama-French model, we use a period of 60 months before the announcement date.
Abnormal returns adjusted for both size and MTB ratio were computed dividing the universe of
companies on the CRSP tape into 100 portfolios for every month of observation. Unlike traditional15
portfolio selection, where companies are first ranked by their size and then within each size decile
by their MTB ratio, we rank our portfolios by size and by the MTB ratio simultaneously and do it
for every month.  The unconditional ranking and the larger number of reference portfolios (100
instead of more traditional 50) allow us to combine the advantages of a closer match of firm
characteristics offered by the control company method, with the statistical stability of the
benchmark portfolio method.  The abnormal performance of each firm from our sample is then
calculated each month in comparison to the portfolio the firm belonged to in that particular month.
For the buy-and-hold abnormal returns, we use the same size- and MTB-based benchmark
portfolios to calculate returns on the investment in the acquiring firm’s stock that is held for a
period of up to 48 months.   Abnormal performance is therefore computed through the difference
between the acquiring firm’s stock return and the equal weighted investment into the size- and
MTB- ranked portfolio that the acquiring bank belongs to. This portfolio is rebalanced every month
and the classification of each bank in the (Size x MTB) matrix re-evaluated.
The third type of long-term performance measures used is based on accounting data.
ACQROACi is computed as the difference between the change in the acquiring company’s ROA
over i+1 years starting from one year before the acquisition and similar change in the region’s
average ROAreg over the same period.
The Model
The model tested in this study is specified as follows:
) ( ) ( 1 Re 1 Re g,t- c,t- i g,t i c,t c,i ROA ROA ROA ROA ACQROA - - - = + +16
Abnormal performancen = a + b · integrationn + c · replacementn + d · experiencen +
e · codificationn + f · codification-integrationn + controls n + e n,
where n  is the number of the focal event (a particular merger announcement), the abnormal
performance measure can be CAR over –10 days around the announcement date, CAR over 36 and
48 months after the announcement, abnormal returns for buy-and-hold strategy for 36 and 48
months and ACQROAc,3. The interaction term between codification and integration is meant to
capture eventual increasing performance effects of the knowledge codification process at increasing
levels of the complexity of the task, as per H5. The expected sign for the coefficients are: b>0, c<0,
d>0, e>0, f>0, whereas the error term is distributed according to the standard normality
assumptions.
We use ordinary least squares regression to estimate the coefficients of the model. Weighted-least
squares and stepwise regression produce essentially the same results and are not reported here.
Since codification and integration are highly correlated with their interaction term, z-scores
transformations of both variables were utilized and then multiplied to create the interaction term.
This eliminated the multicollinearity problem in the estimated model (VIF was lower than 3 for all
the covariates). Outliers were identified as the observations more than 3 standard deviations away
from the mean of the dependent variable, and excluded from the analysis.
Controls
Among the control variables included in the model we entered:
• Pre-acquisition characteristics of the target, which have been considered important in the
literature: the degree of geographic overlap as an approximation of resource relatedness (Healy,
Palepu and Ruback, 1992) and the quality of the assets purchased.
• The total asset size of the acquiring firm and the relative size of the acquired firm with respect to
the acquirer.17
• The number of acquisitions completed by the same acquirer in the same year of the focal
transaction.  The objective is to partially control for the fact that the impact of the explanatory
variables might be influenced by the simultaneous completion of multiple acquisitions.
4 Results
The mean, standard deviation and the correlation coefficients of the variables entered in the model
specified above are shown in Table 1. A set of t-tests confirm that none of the accounting and
financial measures adopted to approximate short-term and long-term performance result to have a
mean value significantly different from zero, confirming the prevailing result of the literature
(Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Jarrell et al., 1988: Frank et al. 1991; Loderer and Martin, 1992).  With
respect to the correlation coefficients, it is interesting to notice that long-term accounting
performance significantly correlates with long-term portfolio-adjusted stock price variations but not
with the short-term ones.  Even more surprisingly, short-term returns are not significantly correlated
with any of the long-term return measures.  Also, post-acquisition decisions exhibit large and
significant coefficients with all long-term performance measures, with a positive sign for the level
of integration and a negative sign for the degree of replacement of the target’s management.  The
capability-development measures, however, show a weaker correlational evidence, in that
acquisition experience was not correlated with any performance measure, while knowledge
codification was positively correlated with the longer range ones (4 years ROA variation and 4 year
stock price variation).  This is a first clue to the importance of explaining organizational learning
processes with two distinct effects: the experience accumulation and the knowledge codification
processes.  While they are clearly correlated with each other, they do exhibit different implications
for acquisition performance
2.  Given the large and significant correlation coefficients tying many of
                                               
2  On Figure 1 a plot of the experience and codification levels of the 47 institutions surveyed shows that, while at high
experience levels (>25 events) process codification is widely diffused, at low and medium experience levels there is a
wide dispersion of the degree of codification.  Some acquirers develop acquisition tools from just a handful of
experiences, while others do not invest in codification processes even after having completed 15-20 acquisitions.18
the explanatory variables, though, a multiple regression analysis is necessary in order to verify the
net contribution of each of them to the variation of the dependent variable.
Table 2 contains the results of OLS estimations of the model presented above with each of the
performance measures utilized. It shows the variation in accounting performance, the stock price
immediate reaction to the acquisition announcement and long-term abnormal returns regressed on
control and independent variables. The standardized coefficients of the impact of each independent
variable on the different performance approximations are presented in the different columns. The
first column presents the results for the accounting measure used, the difference between the change
in the company’s ROA from one year before to three years after the acquisition and the average
change in the region’s average ROAreg over the same period. The second and third columns presents
the impacts on benchmark portfolio-adjusted CARs over 3 and 4 years, respectively
3.  The fourth
and fifth column, then, shows the results of the analysis in the case of a buy-and-hold strategy in the
presence of the same benchmark portfolio-adjusted return.  Finally, the sixth column offers the
same analysis in the case of daily cumulative abnormal returns starting 10 days before the
announcement and ending 10 days after the announcement
4.
The overall fit of the model tested with the data utilized is strong in all the long-term performance
specifications (F values ranging from 4.7 to 8.8, adjusted R
2 statistics as high as 0.399), but is
barely significant for the short-term performance specification (F statistic =1.767, p<0.10).
The individual regression coefficients show remarkably similar effects for all the long-term
(financial and accounting) approximations of the performance construct.  With respect to the post-
acquisition integration decisions, the level of integration influences performance in a significant and
positive way (p values <0.01, except 3 year buy-and-hold with p<0.05), lending support to H1,
                                               
3  Similar analyses were performed using the CARs with a beta-adjusted model and using CARs relative to the Fama-
French three-factor model, with essentially similar results with respect to the experience and the knowledge codification
variables, while weaker results for the post-acquisition integration decisions variables.19
while the replacement of the top management team of the acquired firm has a negative and
significant impact (p<0.01), as per the formulation of H2.  It is to be noted that the magnitude of
these coefficients is the largest among the explanatory variables of the model and reaches values of
absolute relevance, particularly for the management replacement impact (standardized beta varies
between 0.4 and 0.65).
Regarding the capability-building part of the model, acquisition experience does not show any
significant impact, failing to support H3, while the degree of knowledge codification has positive
effect on the accounting performance as well as on the benchmark adjusted cumulative abnormal
returns over 4 years (p<0.05), thereby supporting H4 at least for the longest periods utilized.
Interestingly, the interaction term between the level of integration and the degree of knowledge
codification show a positive and significant impact on accounting performance (p<0.05) and on all
the long-term financial measures (p<0.01), confirming the proposition advanced in H5 on the
increasing role that knowledge codification assumes, as a collective learning mechanism, with
increasing degrees of complexity of the integration task.
The short-term abnormal returns are not sensitive to any of the hypothesized effects. Neither
integration decisions, nor organizational learning processes influence them in a statistically
significant way.  While the lack of sensitivity to integration decisions can be explained by the fact
that they are rarely communicated at the time of the announcement, the inconsistency between the
short-term and the long-term performance implication of the explicit learning efforts that acquirers
make in order to develop their integration practice represents a puzzle for market efficiency theory.
The implication, in fact, is that markets systematically discount their understanding of the acquirers’
integration capability at the time of the announcement, and then adjust upward their expectations on
the acquiring company’s stock performance as they learn about its ability to deliver on the
integration strategies.  This is even more worrying if one considers the fact that the sample under
                                                                                                                                                           
4 The analysis was replicated with (-3,+3) days, and (-5,+5) days windows without significant changes in the results20
study is composed of relatively experienced acquirers (avg. experience = 11.25), whose past track
record of integration decisions and performance outcomes should be available to market analysts
and allow them to form informed opinions as to the effectiveness of the acquiring firm’s integration
practices.
For what concerns the other control measures entered in the model, the quality of the target’s assets
has a significant and negative impact on all dependent variables. This means that transferring
acquirer’s resources and capabilities to the target is a more powerful way to create shareholders’
value than doing the opposite (i.e. learning from the target), at least in the context under study. The
premium paid will typically be of more modest magnitude, and the immediate stock price reaction
after the acquisition announcement for poorly performing targets should reflect that. However, the
long-run performance should not depend on this factor, as it should have been entirely anticipated at
the announcement. Therefore, the market is either too optimistic about the post-acquisition
acquirers’ performance after acquiring good firms or too pessimistic about their performance after
acquiring poorly performing firms.
Acquirer’s size also has a significant and negative impact on all dependent variables, except
changes in ROA.  Abnormal returns are not size adjusted, but the presence of the acquisition
relative size in the model should help control for this potential bias in the estimates.  Again, it is
interesting to note that only part of this effect is captured at the announcement, and that markets are
systematically overoptimistic about the ability of large acquiring firms to extract value from their
acquisitions.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom among banking scholars and practitioners, the target’s
geographic market overlap with the acquirer has little predictive power about the acquirer’s future
performance.  The coefficient of the regression on accounting performance is not significant, and
the financial performance ones become significant only after 4 years. This is surprising because21
acquiring a bank having at least part of its branch network in areas where the acquirer is present
should allow superior potential from the rationalization of the geographic coverage and the cost
savings from closing redundant branches.  However, this might come at a cost due to the
complexity of managing the entire process, cost that is typically not identified and allocated to the
acquisition process (i.e. it is hidden in the administrative cost structure of the combined entity).
Also, “out-market” acquisitions can create shareholders’ value in ways different from cost
efficiencies, such as cross-selling products and transferring capabilities (e.g. marketing or loan
processing practices) across the two organizations, enhancing the revenue growth of the combined
firm.
Robustness of the results
In order to check for the stability of these results to varying specifications of the dependent variable,
we replicated the analysis with different time windows ((-3, +3) days and (-5, +5) days) around the
announcement for the short-term event study, as well as different specifications of the long-term
stock returns (monthly CARs using beta-adjusted model and Fama-French three-factor model),
obtaining results substantially similar to the ones reported.
The other direction of exploration to test for the robustness of these results was towards a deeper
understanding of the effects of the capability development mechanisms on post-acquisition
performance. As described in the theory section, there are several reasons to believe that the tacit
and explicit learning effects might not be linear.  The first acquisition experiences might be
inappropriately applied to seemingly similar but inherently different contexts, therefore having a
negative effect on performance, which will attenuate and eventually reverse with increasing
experience levels. Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999), for example, find a U-shaped relationship
between acquisition experience and performance. The degree of codification of the acquisition
process might suffer from the opposite problem, as the costs of updating the manuals and systems
created, as well as the implicit bureaucratic load rise as the acquirer reaches very high levels of22
explicit learning behavior.  An inverted U-shaped curve between codification and performance
might therefore be expected in this case.
To investigate the empirical relevance of these arguments in our sample of acquisitions, we include
square terms for knowledge codification and acquisition experience into the regression equation. As
an additional check we split the sample in two parts and run linear regressions separately for
companies with low (high) knowledge codification and with low (high) acquisition experience. The
break-point (10 acquisitions experienced and 7 acquisition tools developed) have been identified as
the points of maxima and minima estimated from the equations with the squared terms.
For the sake of space, in Table 3 we report only the results for the coefficients related to the
integration decisions and the capability building variables.  Panel A shows results of OLS
regression analyses when square terms for the knowledge codification and the acquisition
experience variables are included.  Performance and knowledge codification exhibit an inverted U-
shaped relationship, with significant and positive main effect and significantly negative quadratic
coefficient for all the specifications of the dependent variable. Contrary to expectations, though,
acquisition experience does not reach significance levels neither in its main nor in its quadratic
effect, even though the signs reveal a unanimous directional tendency towards the U-shaped
relationship (negative main and positive quadratic effects).
These results are confirmed through further analyses with split samples on high and low end
observations for knowledge codification and acquisition experience (panels B, C, D and E).
Knowledge codification has a significant and positive coefficient when the low codification sample
(Panel B) is considered, and significantly negative for ROA in the high knowledge codification one
(Panel C).  As before, the evidence on the performance implications of acquisition experience is
overall inconclusive.23
5 Conclusions
This paper advanced a set of theoretical arguments as possible explanations of the mechanisms
through which acquiring firms can learn how to manage the post-acquisition integration process,
and under what conditions these mechanisms might and might not work.  The empirical analysis
used a combination of financial, accounting and questionnaire response data to estimate the
performance implications of a complex model which included, in addition to tacit and explicit
learning mechanisms, post-acquisition integration decisions as well as pre-acquisition
characteristics of the two firms.  Results suggest that firms do learn from their past acquisition
experience, but in a complex and non-linear way.  Experience accumulation is not sufficient to
directly impact performance, as the low frequency, the high heterogeneity and the fundamental
causal ambiguity inherent in acquisition processes prevent standard learning-by-doing mechanism
from displaying their positive effects.  However, specific investments in explicit learning processes
aimed at the articulation and codification of lessons learned from prior acquisition experiences do
exhibit significant and positive impact on performance. The development of acquisition-specific
tools, such as manuals and decision-support systems, has in fact a positive linear effect on
performance, but is also subject to decreasing marginal benefits, presumably due to increasingly
high updating costs and bureaucratic loads.
The second important set of findings relates to the performance effects of post-acquisition
integration decisions.  The level of integration positively impacts performance while the
replacement of the target’s top management, controlling for the effect of target’s asset quality,
negatively impacts performance.  These results suggest that the value creation process in
acquisitions is crucially influenced by the way acquirers manage the integration phase, over and
above the pre-acquisition characteristics of the acquired business.  In particular, the negative sign in
the performance impact of the replacement of the target’s top management team indicates that the
dominant view of acquisitions as tools through which management teams compete on the market for
corporate control (and the winners sweep away the losers) might represent a good description of24
how acquirers approach the task, but should be qualified with respect to the performance
implications.  All other things being equal, the substitution or disposition of the target’s leadership
is likely to destroy, as opposed to enhance, shareholders’ value.  Not only is the value of human
capital as well as social capital lost, but the complexity of the integration process might grow
exponentially, due to the non-cooperative or even antagonistic environment which is typically
established as a consequence of the perception of unfair decision-making in the integration phase.
These effects, however, are only present in the models with long-term accounting and financial
performance measures, which brings us to the third and final finding.  The financial markets do not
seem to incorporate all publicly available and potentially valuable information into prices
immediately after the acquisition announcement.  Significant long-term abnormal returns have been
identified in connection with acquirer's size, target’s asset quality, acquirer’s learning (both linearly
and non-linearly) and acquirer’s post-acquisition decisions. A possible explanation for this result
rests on two arguments. The first has to do with the lack of communication of these decisions on the
part of the acquiring firm.  Acquirers refrain from disclosing the integration decisions both at the
time of the announcement and afterwards in order to avoid threats of legal suits.  Doing so, though,
does not allow the financial markets to form a thorough opinion on the chances of success of the
completed acquisition.  The second explanation is that financial markets should be able to anticipate
at least the general integration approach, based on past acquisitive behavior, and to assess the
acquirer’s ability to deliver, based on past performance record.  The fact that they do not seem to
have been able to do so (at least at the time of the sample) poses some important questions as to the
limits of market efficiency in the context of complex events such as the announcement of
acquisitions.  An interesting extension of this study, in fact, would be to verify the markets’ ability
to anticipate firms’ post-event behavior and evaluate their ability to implement in similarly complex
contexts, such as the announcement of joint-ventures, of strategic alliances, of market entries, and
so on.25
Other studies could address the numerous limitations of the present one as well.  First, the study is
situated in a specific industry context, the banking sector, which might be subject to idiosyncratic
mechanisms for the creation of value in acquisition contexts, for the management of integration
processes and for the development of integration-specific capabilities.  Generalizability of our
results can be then probed by replicating the analysis with data from significantly different industry
domains, such as the high-tech sector, or through a multi-industry study.  Second, the design of the
present study has deliberately excluded the acquisition of non-banking assets by banking firms.
Some of our results might be dependent upon the fact that no diversification-driven acquisitions
have been allowed in the sample, and should be probed by extending the sample to a wider variety
of targets.  On a more theoretical ground, the dimensions of the integration process studied might
not, and probably are not, exhaustive of the possible list of key factors explaining integration
behavior by acquiring firms.  The speed of execution, for example, is a relevant dimension that has
not been looked at neither theoretically, nor empirically. Similarly, the learning mechanisms
identified and studied in this work might be a poor representation of the alternatives available to the
acquiring firm to develop collective competence specific to the management of acquisition
processes.  For example, external aid might come from management consulting firms, and the
attention of top management at the corporate level towards the execution of the first few integration
processes at the divisional level might be a powerful stimulus to speed up collective learning.
While we have little doubt that a lot of work is needed in order to uncover the possible
contingencies that might explain the variation between superior and poor performance in acquisition
processes, we also believe that the theoretical arguments as well as the empirical findings of the
present study might at least contribute to shift the attention of scholars away from the assessment of
the average performance implications of the phenomenon and towards a more stimulating debate on
the root causes of value creation and value destruction in corporate acquisitions.26
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Table 1. Post-Acquisition Performance: Correlation Matrix
Table 2 shows statistics (average and standard deviation) and correlation matrix for the variables used.




2 CAR 36 months 209 .0300 .282 .366
3 CAR 48 months 174 .0695 .331 .507 .841
4 Buy & Hold 36 m. 209 .026 .467 .346. .969 .806
5 Buy & Hold 48 m. 174 .0595 .597 .478 .839 .975 .829
6 CAR 10 days 307 -.0027 .064 -.093 .0061 .0161 -.024 .0215
7 Acquirer’s size 452 23.072 23.01 .123 -.004 -.053 .016 -.055 -.148
8 Relative target size 422 6.085 11.4 -.014 -.001 -.016 -.002 -.006 -.082 -.027
9 Simultaneous
acquisitions
564 3.578 2.82 .215 .145 .195 .149 .203 -.016 .480 -.220
10 Target quality 458 -.01 1.06 -.086 -.168 -.144 -.154 -.167 -.0689 -.064 .049 .052
11 Target relatedness 479 .614 .485 .074 .205 .175 .177 .170 .0408 .184 -.083 .143 -.198
12 Level of integration 478 2.632 .702 .165 .106 .134 .074 .123 -.0168 .098 -.091 .171 -.214 .397
13 Top management
replacement
466 1.455 1.32 -.221 -.143 -.215 -.146 -.196 .0295 -.061 .021 -.210 -.308 .347 .414
14 Acquisition
experience
564 11.25 10.16 .036 .107 .127 .092 .087 .0087 .502 -.087 .515 .033 .169 .121 -.053
15 Knowledge
Codification
508 4.874 3.66 .138 .113 .207 .088 .163 -.0308 .431 -.052 .362 .172 .03 -.108 -.108 .455
16 Codification x
Integration
430 .168 1.15 .15 .140 .069 .169 .104 -.0048 -.022 .071 .05 .058 .059 -.148 -.109 -.06 -.173
Pearson’s correlation.  Bold numbers are significant at the 0.05 and bold and italic at 0.0131
Table 2. Post-Acquisition Performance: Changes in ROA and Stock Abnormal Returns After and Around the Acquisition Announcement
Dates vs. Benchmark Portfolio Returns. OLS regressions
Table 2 shows regression standardized coefficients, F-statistics and adjusted R
2. The dependent variable in the first column is the difference between
the change in the company’s ROA over 4 years starting from one year before the acquisition and similar change in the region’s average ROAreg over the
same period. Dependent variables in columns 2 and 3 are cumulative abnormal returns over 3 and 4 years adjusted for size and market-to-book ratio by
comparing with corresponding benchmark portfolio returns. 100 benchmark portfolios are formed using size and market-to-book ratio ranking.
Dependent variables in columns 4 and 5 are the abnormal returns of the “buy-and-hold” strategy for 3 and 4 years holding periods using benchmark
























Acquirer’s size -.032 -.206** -.280*** -.162* -.274*** -.2**
Relative acquisition size .059 -.066 .096 .052 .096 -.105
Simultaneous acquisitions -.014 -.007 .021 .030 .092 -.049
Target quality -.2*** -.301*** -.314*** -.280*** -.317*** -.235***
Target’s market overlap .0086 .152 .186** .116 .19** .098
Post-acquisition Decisions
Level of integration .261*** .277*** .392*** .246** .33*** -.101
Degree of replacement -.388*** -.542*** -.652*** -.487*** -.597*** -.028
Integration Capability
Acquisition experience -.048 .054 .028 .03 .-.035 .078
Knowledge codification .212** .119 .248** .082 .231** .044
Codification x Integration .164** .222*** .228*** .214*** .254*** .099
F statistic 6.104*** 5.853*** 8.818*** 4.707*** 8.052*** 1.767*
Adjusted R
2 .180 .248 .399 .201 .374 .0367
N 233 148 119 148 119
Standardized coefficients.  Significant at the 0.01 (***), 0.05(**) or 0.10 (*) level32
Table 3. Nonlinear Effects of Learning and Experience. Transaction Level of Analysis
Panel A reports coefficients associated with learning and experience when the square terms are included into full regression (only the coefficients of interest are shown). Panels B-C
report coefficients associated with learning and experience in full linear regression when sample is restricted to low codification (Panel B), to high codification (Panel C), to low















Panel A. Regression with quadratic terms (114 observations)
Knowledge codification 1.217*** 1.241*** 1.166*** .9** 1.116***
Square of knowledge codification -1.424*** -1.059*** -.997*** -.68** -.926***
Acquisition experience -.083 -.284 -.27 -.318 -.451
Square of acquisition experience .021 .251 .336 .212 .454
Level of integration .269** .098 .266** .096 .205*
Degree of replacement -.525*** -.608*** -.603*** -.564*** -.546***
F statistic 6.297*** 5.984*** 8.323*** 4.444*** 7.604***
Adjusted R
2 .36 .346 .438 .268 .412
Panel B. Regression with low knowledge codification (less than 7 tools).  60 observations.
Knowledge codification .324** .292** .335** .204 .353**
Acquisition experience .192 .052 .143 -.01 .042
Level of integration -.012 -.242 .051 -.301 -.021
Degree of replacement -.096 -.13 -.057 -.044 .019
F statistic 1.907* 2.459** 2.397** 1.729 2.204**
Adjusted R
2 .133 .198 .191 .11 .17
Panel C. Regression with high knowledge codification (more than 6 tools).  54 observations
Knowledge codification -.395** -.203 -.198 -.130 -.195
Acquisition experience -.382* -.123 -.067 -.207 -.064
Level of integration .667* .514 .373 .572 .399
Degree of replacement -.453*** -.659*** -.726*** -.645*** -.733***
F statistic 7.439*** 7.386*** 12.061*** 7.177*** 13.519***
Adjusted R
2 .549 .547 .676 .625 .70333
Panel D. Linear regression with small experience (less than 10 acquisitions)  50 observations
Knowledge codification .518*** .7*** .814*** .668*** .797***
Acquisition experience -.063 .031 -.058 .060 -.046
Level of integration .062 -.069 -.171 -.033 -.154
Degree of replacement -.12 -.28** -.139 -.262* -.074
F statistic 7.526** 8.934** 9.691*** 7.25*** 7.726***
Adjusted R
2 .571 .618 .640 .561 .579
Panel E. Linear regression with high experience (greater than 9 acquisitions) 64 observations
Knowledge codification -.518*** .197 .044 .229 .104
Acquisition experience -.063 .020 .188 -.017 .172
Level of integration .434*** .239 .365** .065 .27*
Degree of replacement -.519*** -.783*** -.796*** -.663*** -.768***
F statistic 6.104*** 3.802*** 6.350*** 3.266*** 6.374***
Adjusted R
2 .448 .308 .459 .265 .460
Standardized coefficients.  Significant at the 0.01 (***), 0.05(**) or 0.10 (*) level